This paper discusses preliminary investigations on the monitorability of contracts for web service descriptions. There are settings where servers do not guarantee statically whether they satisfy some specified contract, which forces the client (i.e., the entity interacting with the server) to perform dynamic checks. This scenario may be viewed as an instance of Runtime Verification, where a pertinent question is whether contracts can be monitored for adequately at runtime, otherwise stated as the monitorability of contracts. We consider a simple language of finitary contracts describing both clients and servers, and develop a formal framework that describes server contract monitoring. We define monitor properties that potentially contribute towards a comprehensive notion of contract monitorability and show that our simple contract language satisfies these properties.
Introduction
Web services [7, 6] typically consist of two types of computing entities. Servers offer ranges of sequences of service interactions to clients, which in turn interact with these services and occasionally reach a state denoting client satisfaction. The service interactions offered by a server typically follow some predefined structure that may be formalised as a contract [6, 7, 15, 3] . Dually, the service interactions invoked by a client may also be expressed within the same formalism.
The contract calculus defined in [15, 2, 5] is an abstract formalism equipped with an operational semantics that provides an implementation-agnostic, high-level description of client-server interactions; this permits formal reasoning about web services, such as whether a client is compatible with a server or whether a server is able to satisfy the service interactions requested by the client. Such reasoning may, for instance, be used by clients for dynamic service discovery, where a client decides to interact with a server whenever the contract it advertises satisfies the requirements of the client. 
It states that the server first expects a login service interaction followed by either a valid or invalid service invocation; the operator ⊕ denotes that the server decides autonomously whether to invoke valid or invalid in response. If it branches to the latter, it terminates all interactions, denoted by 0. However, if it internally decides to invoke the service interaction valid, it then offers a choice (denoted by the symbol +) of service interactions: it either accepts (account balance) query interactions or else (fund) transfer interactions. A contract describing the behaviour of a possible bank client is given below:
login. (invalid.reason.1) + (expired.1) + (valid.query.1) Within this framework, there still remains the question of whether a service behaviour actually adheres to the contract it advertises. In general, static techniques (such as session-based type systems [9] , or state-based model-checking of compliance, must or fair testing inclusion [15, 2, 5] ) are used to verify before deployment whether a server implementation respects the contract that describes it. However, there are cases where this solution is not applicable. For instance, the client may decide not to trust the static verifier used by the server. Alternatively, in a dynamic setting where service components are downloaded and installed at runtime, pre-deployment checks cannot be made on the server implementation since some components only become available for inspection at runtime. There are also cases whereby a server does not come equipped with a formal description at all.
After a login service invocation, this client expects either of three responses: an invalid interaction prompting another service request that asks for a reason why the login was invalid, a login expired invocation or else a valid login interaction that is followed by invoking a
In these circumstances, a client can check that a server respects an advertised (or expected) contract by analysing the behaviour exhibited by the server at runtime. There are a number of cases where such a solution is adopted [4, 12] , making use of dynamic monitoring, possibly in conjunction with other verification techniques. This monitoring of systems may be seen as an instance of Runtime Verification (RV) [13] , a lightweight formal verification technique used to check the current execution of a program by verifying it against some properties. In a typical setup, the monitor observing the running system raises a flag when a conclusive verdict is reached, denoting that the property being checked for is either satisfied or violated.
An important question in any RV setup is that of the monitorability of the specification language considered. Indeed, it is generally the case that not all aspects of a specification can be monitored for and determined at runtime, as shown in [8, 1, 11] for specification languages such as LTL and the modal µ-calculus. In this work, we start to investigate the monitorability of contracts which, in turn, sheds light on the viability and expressiveness of the dynamic contract checking setup discussed above. In contrast to earlier work on monitorability, we do not rely on an external formal logic for specifying the properties expected by a server contract, e.g., a satisfaction relation p |= φ where φ would be a formula from a logic defined over server contract p through the semantic relation |=. Instead, we use the subcontract server relation q ⊑ SRV p defined in [15] as a refinement semantic relation where q is an abstract description of the expected properties of a server contract p, thus using the contract language itself as a specification language. Within this setting, we investigate whether our monitoring mechanism is expressive enough to verify whether a server p indeed refines an abstract description q.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews our contract language and defines our notion of contract satisfaction. Section 3 introduces our monitoring setup and Section 4 relates verdicts reached by our monitored computations to the contract satisfactions discussed in Section 2. Section 5 concludes by discussing related and future work. Figure 1 describes the syntax and semantics of (finite) servers and clients. Let a, b, c, d . . . ∈ NAMES be a set of names denoting interaction addresses. Let · be a complementation operation on these names where we refer to the complement of a as a; the operation is an involution, where a = a. The set of actions action not in ACT denoting internal unobservable activity, where we let µ ∈ ACT ∪ {τ}. Servers, p, q ∈ SRV, consist of either the terminated server 0, a prefixed server α.p that first engages in interaction α and then behaves as p, an external choice p+ q that can either behave as p or q depending on the interactions it engages in, or an internal choice p ⊕ q that autonomously decides to either behave as p or q. Clients, r, s ∈ CLI, have a similar structure but may also consist of the term 1 denoting contract fulfilment. The semantics of both servers and clients are given in terms of a Labelled Transition System (LTS) where the labelled transition relation p µ − → q is defined as the least relation satisfying the rules in Figure 1 ; the definition of the transition relation for clients r µ − → s is analogous and thus elided. The definition is standard and follows that of related languages such as CCS [14] . For instance, the term α.p transitions with (action) label α to the continuation p; if p can engage in an interaction on µ and transition to p ′ , then an external choice term involving p, e.g., p + q may also transition to p ′ after exhibiting action µ; by contrast, an internal choice involving p, e.g., p ⊕ q may transition to p without exhibiting an external action (τ is used).
Servers, Clients and Satisfaction
Servers and clients may be composed together to form a system, r p, so as to engage in a sequence of interactions. Interactions are also defined as an LTS over systems, through the rules ASYS, ASYC and SYN in Figure 1 . As is standard, silent transitions by either server or client allow them to transition autonomously in a system. However, a client transition on an external action must be matched by a server transition on the (dual) co-action for the transition to occur in the resp. system, denoting clientserver interaction. Computations are sequences of system transitions r 0 p 0 τ − → . . . τ − → r n p n , denoted as r 0 p 0 = ⇒ r n p n ; the sequence may be potentially empty, n = 0, where no transitions are made, in which case we have r 0 = r n and p 0 = p n . A computation r 0 p 0 = ⇒ r n p n is maximal whenever 
The satisfaction predicate sat(−, −) induces a natural preorder amongst servers.
Definition 2.3 (Server Preorder [15]). A server p is a subcontract of server q, denoted as p ⊑ SRV q, whenever, for all clients r, sat(p, r) implies sat(q, r). Dually, q is referred to as a supercontract of p.
Intuitively, p ⊑ SRV q of Definition 2.3 means that we can substitute a server p by a server q, safe in the knowledge that any client satisfied by p would not be affected. Figure 2 describes the monitoring framework used to analyse servers purporting to adhere to some advertised contract. It defines the syntax of these monitors, which follow the general structure used in earlier works [11, 1] whereby monitors may reach any one of the three verdicts VERD, namely acceptance, rejection, or the inconclusive verdict. In addition to the basic prefixing patterns used in [11, 10] , we here also use action complementation, α, to denote any action apart from α. As in [11, 10] , a monitor is allowed to branch, m + n, depending on the actions observed at runtime. We also find it convenient to express a merge monitor operator that facilitates the composition of monitor specifications, m × n.
Monitors and Monitored Computations
The semantics of a monitor is given in terms of the LTS defined by the rules in Figure 2 . This is best viewed as the evolution of a monitor in response to a (finite) execution trace t ∈ ACT * , consisting of a sequence of actions α 1 , . . . , α n . Verdicts are irrevocable when reached, and do not change upon viewing A monitored server contract consists of a server p that is instrumented with a monitor m, denoted as m ⊳ p. The behaviour of monitored contracts is defined as an LTS through the rules stated in Figure 2 , and relies on the resp. LTSs of the monitor and the server. Rule IMON states that if a server can transition with action α and the monitor can follow this by transitioning with the same action, then in an instrumented server they transition in lockstep. However, if the monitor cannot follow such a transition the instrumentation forces it to terminate with an inconclusive verdict, end, while the process is allowed to proceed unaffected; see rule ITER. Finally, rule IASY allows a contract to evolve independently from the monitor when performing silent τ moves (which are unobservable to the monitor). We refer to a sequence of transitions from a monitored contract as a monitored computation and use the standard notation m ⊳ p t = ⇒ m ′ ⊳ p ′ that abstracts over τ-moves in trace t.
A few comments are in order. First, we highlight the fact that in the operational semantics for monitored systems of Figure 2 , the monitor does not have access to the internal state of the server generating the trace, and its observations are limited to the execution that the server chooses to exhibit at runtime. This is meant to model the RV scenarios mentioned in Section 1, where the source of the executing system cannot be analysed: from the point of view of the runtime monitoring and verification, the server description is merely used to generate traces. Second, we note that, in a monitored server setup, any visible behaviour is instigated by the server, relegating the instrumented monitor to a passive role that merely follows the server actions. Stated otherwise, the server drives the behaviour in a monitored system and dictates the execution path that the monitor can analyse at runtime.
In what follows, we explain how monitors work through a series of examples. The exposition focuses on monitors that produce rejection verdicts, but the discussion can be extended to acceptance verdicts in a straightforward manner. Specifically, since the monitor c.N + c.end checks for violations of  contract c.0 and, the minimally extended monitor a.N + a.(b.N + b.end) checks for violations of a.b.0  as discussed in Example 3.1, we can construct the composite monitor (a.N + a.(b.N + b.end) 
Preliminary results towards Monitorability
Monitorability may be broadly described as the relationship between the properties of a logic specifying program behaviour and the detection capabilities of a monitoring setup instrumented over such programs. It is therefore parametric with respect to the logic and monitoring setup considered. In what follows, we sketch out preliminary investigations that focus on the monitor rejections defined in Section 3, and attempt to relate them to violations of the server preorder defined in Section 2.
We have already defined enough machinery to be able to state formally two important properties. Definition 4.1 states that a monitor m soundly monitors for a server contract p if and only if, whenever it rejects a server q, it is indeed the case that q is not a supercontract of p. In a sense, the dual of this is Definition 4.2, which states that a monitor m completely monitors for a server contract p if and only if every q that is not a supercontract of p is rejected by m. We can also extend these monitorability definitions to a specification language of contracts (i.e., a set of contracts).
Definition 4.3 (Language Rejection Monitorability). A set of contracts C is:
• sound rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · smon(p, m)
• complete rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · cmon(p, m)
• rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · smon(p, m) and cmon(p, m) We can readily argue in a formal manner that the contract language SRV of Figure 1 We deem sound rejection to be the minimum correctness requirement to be expected from the contract monitors we consider. Note, however, that the contract language SRV of Figure 1 is trivially sound rejection-monitorable via the monitor end; this monitor never reaches a rejection state and thus trivially satisfying rej(p, end) for any p ∈ SRV. However, we argue that this monitor, end, is not very useful.
We attempt to go one step further and define an automated monitor synthesis function that returns a monitor for every server in the contract language SRV. We argue, at least informally, that these synthesised monitors are, in some sense, useful because they perform a degree of violation detections. Importantly, however, we show that these synthesised monitors are rejection sound, according to Definition 4.1. from Example 3.3. Secondly, note that the monitor synthesis does not attempt to perform any detection violation for the contract 0. Since 0 is in some sense a bottom element in the preorder, no supercontract of 0 is allowed to perform any visible action. Thus, in cases where all the actions permissible in SRV are known up front as a finite set {α 1 , . . . , α n }, we can improve the precision of our synthesis through the alternative definition 0 def = α 1 .N + . . . + α n .N for the case where p = 0. Third, note that the synthesis for both internal and external choice constructs coincide which, in a sense, is due to the inherent discriminating limits of RV. Consider, by way of example, the monitor syntheses below: Whenever rej(q, p ) then it is necessarily the case that p ⊑ SRV q Proof. By structural induction on the server specification p.
Conclusion
We have presented preliminary investigations relating to the monitorability of contracts, high-level descriptions for web services. We developed a monitoring framework that complements the operational semantics of server contracts. We then focused on the rejection expressivity of the monitors within this framework and related it to cases where it is unsafe to replace one server (contract) with another. Within our simple framework, we were already able to identify limits with respect to monitor detection powers, and were able to diagnose problems with a proposed automated monitor synthesis procedure. We were also able to formally prove that, in spite of its limit, the monitor synthesis considered is, in some sense, correct (Theorem 4.5).
Related and Future Work
The language of contracts for web services has been discussed in several other works prior to ours, such as [2, 5, 15, 7] ; although conceptually simple, it has been shown to be expressive enough to capture the dynamicity of interactions specified by more elaborate contract descriptions. The server preorder considered in this paper captures the essence of the must preorder, studied in [3] and the compliance preorder, studied in [15, 7] ; in our simplistic case of finite servers and clients, the two preorders coincide (modulo minor technical details regarding client satisfaction and computation success). Our notion of monitorability is inspired by that presented in [11] , which relates process satisfaction of a branching-time logic, p |= φ , with detections of monitors synthesised from formulas in this logic, φ ⊳ p. The instrumentation relation considered in this paper is in fact an adaptation to the one used in [11] .
For future work, we aim to achieve a more comprehensive study of monitorability than the preliminary one presented in Section 4. In particular, we plan to consider monitor acceptances as a verdict in addition to rejections, establish stronger results with respect to rejections and consider extended contract descriptions similar to [3, 7] that include recursion and the potential for infinite computation. This will lead to different notions of server refinements such as those resulting from compliance and fair testing preorders [5, 15] . It will be interesting to study whether any of the aforementioned server preorder variants are more monitorable than the others.
